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OWNING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE: THE RISE 
OF OPEN INNOVATION AND THE FUTURE 
OF PATENT LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
ost people are familiar with the story of the genius inventor, toil-
ing away for years in a basement laboratory to one day emerge 
with the perfect solution to age old problems. Whether lighting our 
homes, cutting grass, or allowing instant telecommuting, innovation has 
propelled our societies forward and become one of the driving forces of 
economic success. The classic model of patent protection emerged to 
encourage the inventive process by rewarding the inventor with the ex-
clusive right to profit from public dissemination of the invention.1 
However, the narrative of the lone inventor has faded over the years as 
technological advances, especially the internet, have resulted in dramatic 
changes to the innovative landscape.2 The knowledge sharing potential in 
today’s globalizing world has created an ever increasing demand for fast, 
accessible, and far reaching innovation.3 Further, innovation is now fre-
quently an interdisciplinary, networked process from creation to distribu-
tion, a process that often proves impossible for the lone inventor.4 Even 
companies—the drivers of innovation activities today—have adapted 
traditional in-house research and development (“R&D”) models to access 
the knowledge necessary to make technologically complex products,5 to 
                                                                                                                                               
 1. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANISATION, SCENARIOS FOR 
THE FUTURE 9 (2007), available at http://www.epo.org/topics/patent-system/scenarios-
for-the-future.html. 
 2.  Katherine J. Strandburg, Accommodating User Innovation in the International 
Intellectual Property Regime: A Global Administrative Law Approach, 2009 ACTA 
JURIDICA 283, 283; Keith Sawyer, The Collaborative Nature of Innovation, 30 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 293, 308 (2009). 
 3. José Cláudia Terra, Collaboration in R&R: The Emerging Frontiers of Innova-
tion, TERRAFORUM CONSULTORES 2, http://biblioteca.terraforum.com.br/Paginas/ 
CollaborationinRDTheEmergingFrontiersofInnovation.aspx (last visited May 18, 2010); 
see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OPEN 
INNOVATION IN GLOBAL NETWORKS 15 (2008) [hereinafter OECD]; Koen De Backer, 
Vladimir Lopez-Bassols & Catalina Martinez, Open Innovation in a Global Perspec-
tive—What do Existing Data Tell Us? 7 (Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., STI Working 
Paper 2008/4, 2008), available at http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/ 
workingpaper/230073468188. 
 4. OECD, supra note 3, at 15; John Dubiansky, The Role of Patents in Fostering 
Open Innovation, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH 7, 3 (2006) (“Ideas are created from the recombina-
tion of elements from various firms and in various industries.”); De Backer, Lopez-
Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7. 
 5. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 17, 88; Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007); Sawy-
M
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share exorbitant development costs,6 to mitigate risk,7 and to compete on 
the forefront of global intellectual property markets.8 
The future of innovation is an “open,” collaborative, global approach 
to R&D.9 To promote successful development of this trend, international 
patent reform must account for the changing modes of innovation and the 
new role of intellectual property in business strategies.10 Moreover, in-
stead of focusing solely on patent harmonization, the conversation must 
shift to reevaluate the underlying goals of patent law. Rather than focus-
ing on the ardent protection of ideas, the patent regime should work to 
facilitate the flow of knowledge and to police a growing international 
intellectual property market. 
“Open innovation,” coined in 2003, is a new way of thinking about 
technology production and innovation that assumes that companies bene-
fit most when they utilize ideas and paths to market that are both internal 
and external.11 The key to the theory of open innovation is that firms 
open their doors to the free flow of ideas, allowing capitalization of tech-
nologies wherever most expedient, thus increasing the competitiveness 
of all market players.12 Firms employ a growing division and specializa-
tion of innovation labor in a kind of reciprocal outsourcing model.13 
These strategies hinge on the most efficient use of intellectual property—
whether that entails finding needed technology to complete internal 
R&D, selling unused intellectual property, or collaborating on freely dis-
tributed knowledge.14 One well-known example of open innovation is 
“open source,” a popular means of producing software for which the 
source code is freely accessible as long as users comply with license 
terms which usually forbid restrictive redistribution or inclusion in a 
                                                                                                                                               
er, supra note 2, at 303–04; Gene Slowinski & Matthew W. Sagal, Allocating Patent 
Rights in Collaborative Research Agreements, RES. TECH. MGMT, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 51. 
 6. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 18. 
 7. OECD, supra note 3, at 41; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, 
at 7. 
 8. Cf. OECD, supra note 3, at 27 (“Changes in the marketplace—globalisation 
among them—require companies to be open to external ideas that supplement internal 
R&D in order to remain competitive.”). 
9 Sawyer, supra note 2, at 312. 
10 Cf. id. at 318. 
 11. HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING 
AND PROFITING FROM TECHONOLOGY xxiv (2003). 
 12. See generally id. 
 13. See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: HOW TO THRIVE IN THE NEW 
INNOVATION LANDSCAPE 1–2, 56–57 (2006). 
 14. See generally CHESBROUGH, supra note 11. 
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commercially sold product which locks access to the original code.15 
Thus, in practice, open innovation takes various forms that span a conti-
nuum of collective and proprietary intellectual property creation and use. 
This Note explores the open innovation model with International Busi-
ness Machines Corporation (“IBM”) as its example. IBM is one of the 
world’s largest information technology companies to begin employing 
open innovation strategies after a “near death experience” induced a stra-
tegic shift in its innovation trajectory.16 In 1992, IBM recorded the larg-
est quarterly and annual losses in U.S. corporate history.17 This wake-up 
call resulted in a complete strategic overhaul with a particular emphasis 
on open innovation.18 While IBM is not the first, or only, company to 
expand R&D outside its four walls, the range and global reach of its in-
novation programs19 and its highly visible position in the marketplace 
make it a natural case study.20 
There is skepticism as to whether IBM can make this business model 
work as there are significant concerns regarding the issue of global intel-
lectual property rights.21 Without doubt, IBM must employ significant 
efforts to coordinate and manage its extensive patent portfolio, especially 
with the magnitude of its open innovation programs and the accompany-
ing variations on intellectual property ownership.22 Regardless of the 
agility of IBM’s attorneys to navigate complex intergovernmental patent 
systems, the question remains whether the world’s various patent sys-
tems can support IBM. Under the governance of international patent law, 
which is based on a fixed standard of mass market, seller-based innova-
                                                                                                                                               
 15. Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Challenges of Open Innovation: the Paradox of 
Firm Investment in Open-Source Software, 36 R&D MANAGEMENT 319, 322 (2006); 
Sawyer, supra note 2, at 321. 
 16. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 101; Video: Address of David Yuan, Vice Presi-
dent of Corporate Communications, IBM, at the Collaborative Innovation Summit, held 
by Business Innovation Factory-4 (Oct. 15–16, 2008), available at http://www. 
businessinnovationfactory.com/ iss/video/bif4-david-yaun. 
 17. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 101 (reporting a loss of $4.96 billion after taxes). 
 18. Id. at 102. 
 19. Steve Hamm, Big Blue’s Global Lab, BUS. WK., Sept. 7, 2009, at 40, 42 (“The 
depth of [the] collaboration, the number of partners, the staff involved, and its global 
reach set IBM apart.”). 
 20. This Note makes no endorsement or criticism of IBM or its practices. Rather, the 
singular focus on IBM programs as illustrations of open innovation is purely for the pur-
pose of consistency. 
 21. Hamm, supra note 19, at 42. 
 22. See generally, Athena Ma, IBM Patent Leadership: Balances Proprietary and 
Collaborative Innovation, CHINA IP, Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 24, available at 
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=250. 
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tion,23 open innovation may flounder in its more audacious goals of pa-
tent liberalization and collaborative development. Further, the disparate 
nature of global patent law and the increase of value placed on intellec-
tual property assets have resulted in various obstacles to the functioning 
global patent regime. 
As more multinational and transnational companies are beginning to 
employ open innovation models, issues arise on a global scale. The crea-
tion of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) “deepened the deregula-
tory logic of economic globalization” and linked intellectual property 
rights to global trade, leading to territorial expansion.24 The Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (“TRIPs”) in-
corporated into the WTO, helped to streamline global intellectual proper-
ty rights. Patent law, however, is still largely territorial in nature—there 
is no single global patent registry, and the multiplicity of applications 
necessitates country-by-country monitoring and enforcement. This inter-
national state of patent law leads to significant costs and uncertainties for 
global ventures employing open innovation strategies. 
While business models have evolved and adapted to a newly integrated 
world, patent law continues to reflect a defensive, sales-oriented, proprie-
tary model25 which may be incongruous with open innovation.26 Despite 
this lag in patent law rationale, businesses have shifted their operations 
and are taking an offensive approach to patents, which are now the 
means by which knowledge is shared and built rather than controlled.27 
Additionally, the value of global businesses is increasingly measured 
with intangible assets protected and utilized by intellectual property, ra-
ther than physical assets.28 “Patent registration is now no longer an ex-
pensive way to placate engineers—it is a primary means to generate val-
ue.”29 
This Note posits that for the continued development and growth of 
open innovation, international patent law harmonization must take on 
new dimensions. Due consideration must be given to the expanded role 
that intellectual property assets play in today’s global business strategies 
and the ways in which patent law can better facilitate the active man-
                                                                                                                                               
 23. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 285. 
 24. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 9, 22. 
 25. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 284. 
 26. Cf. Sawyer, supra note 2, at 297 (“[T]he current IP regime is based almost entire-
ly on the linear model of innovation. If that model is inaccurate, then the IP regime cur-
rently is designed to work with an inaccurate conception of the innovation process.”). 
 27. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 9; see OECD, supra note 3, at 103. 
 28. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 17. 
 29. Id. 
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agement of these rights. However, this is not enough; the underlying 
goals of the patent regime must be reevaluated. Rather than a defensive 
exclusion of others, intellectual property rights should serve to further 
knowledge production, ease the sharing of ideas, and promote and police 
an ever growing international intellectual property market. 
Part I of this Note explores the evolution of open innovation, its com-
ponents, its globalization, and its interaction with intellectual property. 
Part II explains the international agreements and domestic laws that con-
stitute international patent law in order to show that despite the move 
toward harmonization, patent law remains stuck in the past. Part III dis-
cusses the main themes of current patent reform and the implications for 
open innovation. Part IV argues that efforts toward harmonization are in 
fact misdirected because the only way to fully support the changing 
global landscape is a complete paradigm shift in the underlying logic of 
patent rights. 
I. OPEN INNOVATION 
In an age of globalization, competition comes from all corners of the 
world, knowledge is increasingly multidisciplinary and widespread, in-
vestment in R&D is on the rise, and product lifecycles are shortening.30 
With such fierce and dispersed competition, and equally diverse and de-
manding consumers, innovation is an important means to secure market 
share and build a sustainable business.31 Companies have thus been faced 
with a “sink or swim” situation;32 they have been forced to adapt to these 
challenges by innovating the way they innovate. One response has been 
the adoption of “open” models of innovation—companies search outside 
their firm for complementary assets, expertise, and research, in order to 
swiftly access new and different technologies and capitalize on their own 
unused intellectual property.33 These R&D activities are also increasingly 
global, as firms explore new markets and local knowledge bases.34 Open 
innovation is a targeted response to today’s interconnected world as it 
                                                                                                                                               
 30. OECD, supra note 3, at 15; Terra, supra note 3, at 2; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & 
Martinez, supra note 3, at 7. 
 31. OECD, supra note 3, at 15. 
 32. Cf. OECD, supra note 3, at 27 (stating “[c]hanges in the marketplace—
globalisation among them—require companies to be open to external ideas that supple-
ment internal R&D in order to remain competitive”). 
 33. OECD, supra note 3, at 15; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, 
at 7. 
 34. OECD, supra note 3, at 15 
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results in faster, more efficient innovation by employing intellectual 
property assets as the catalysts of knowledge production.35 
A. The Rise of Open Innovation 
Innovation methods are constantly changing and adapting to new cir-
cumstances.36 The iconic “lone inventor” was indeed a prominent figure 
in nineteenth century American innovation and, consequently, the patent 
market of the time.37 Fast forward to an industrialized world and the rise 
of the multinational enterprise (“MNE”) and witness R&D models that 
are completely internal, in-house, and closed to outsiders.38 This “closed 
innovation” system relies on the assumption that “successful innovation 
requires control.”39 This creates a “virtuous circle”—companies invest in 
internal R&D, make discoveries, use these discoveries to create new 
products and services, reap profits, and reinvest in further R&D, all of 
which leads to additional breakthroughs.40 The intellectual property gen-
erated from internal R&D is usually guarded closely to prevent unwanted 
imitation.41 In order to compete in this system, firms must have signifi-
cant resources and the ability to commit to lengthy research programs.42 
Hence, giant corporate research laboratories such as Bell Labs and the 
Palo Alto Research Center (“PARC”) dominated the innovation scene of 
that time and contributed to the creation of global industry leaders such 
as AT&T, IBM, and Xerox.43 Indeed, from 1945 to 1980, IBM was the 
central player in the computer industry, “built on internal innovation 
[and] proprietary control over the architecture and all its key elements . . 
. .”44 
During the last years of the twentieth century, changes in the global 
landscape eroded the logic of closed innovation.45 The growing availabil-
ity and mobility of skilled workers led to a diffusion of knowledge and a 
                                                                                                                                               
 35. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 9. 
 36. ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 3–5 (1988). 
 37. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 169 (2008) (citing B. ZORINA 
KAHN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005)); see Sawyer, supra note 2, at 322. 
 38. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at xix; OECD, supra note 3, at 18, 25. 
 39. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at xx. 
 40. Id. at xx–xxi. 
 41. Id. at xxi. 
 42. Id. at xix. 
 43. See id. at xviii–xix. 
 44. Id. at 93, 96. 
 45. Id. at xxii. 
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fluid labor market which further dispersed technical know-how.46 With 
large numbers of skilled graduates entering the job market, more compa-
nies could tap into their talent without the traditionally insurmountable 
costs of R&D.47 Additionally, increased labor mobility resulted in further 
diffusion of knowledge as employees of R&D giants left their jobs to 
pursue careers with suppliers, customers, or start-ups who paid a pre-
mium for their training and experience. IBM felt the blow of this devel-
opment, for example, when one of its engineers left the company and 
shared his knowledge of disk-drive technology with two competitors, 
contributing to the erosion of IBM’s disk-drive dominance.48 
The leakage of intellectual property rights that once “sat on the shelf” 
also contributed to the erosion of closed innovation.49 In a closed system, 
innovation that does not fit the company’s needs or business strategy re-
mains unused, “on the shelf,” collecting dust.50 However, with the in-
crease of firms utilizing R&D, disillusioned employees sought out alter-
native means to utilize their unused discoveries.51 These ideas were 
brought to market without the original company that funded the creative 
R&D.52 Thus, despite the in-house control of closed innovation know-
ledge production, leakage of unused ideas led to an increase in external 
suppliers of specialized, technical components.53 This proliferation of 
suppliers undermined the logic of closed innovation by providing pre-
viously inaccessible knowledge and technology to a broader market.54 
Closed innovators found themselves faced with increased competition 
and pressure from those that already utilize various sources of know-
ledge.55 
Open innovation signals a paradigm shift that encourages innovators to 
integrate external ideas and technology into their own internal R&D, as 
well as to control the flow of unused ideas and direct them to the most 
efficient users on the outside.56 Companies cannot ignore the diffusion of 
knowledge production. Data shows that small firms—those with less 
                                                                                                                                               
 46. Id. at 34. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 35. 
 49. Id. at 40. 
 50. OECD, supra note 3, at 18. 
 51. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 38. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 39. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 40. 
 56. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at xiii; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE 
ECONOMIST, SHARING THE IDEA: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL INNOVATION NETWORKS 10 
(2007) [hereinafter EIU]. 
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than a thousand employees—account for a growing proportion of R&D 
spending.57 Further, universities conducting research around the world 
are more in tune today with industry needs58 and produce more qualified 
graduates ready to work than ever before.59 These facts suggest that the 
playing field for innovation is leveling and that there are fewer econo-
mies of scale in R&D than there once were.60 Additionally, technological 
advances, such as the internet, make dispersed knowledge easier to 
access and less costly.61 The days of highly centralized corporate R&D 
laboratories and knowledge monopolies are gone and companies can no 
longer disregard the contribution of smaller, less traditional innovators.62 
Adaptive companies have developed the tools to leverage multiple 
paths to market for their technology by accepting a new logic of innova-
tion that leverages and exploits existing internal and external know-
ledge.63 “Companies’ solid boundaries are being transformed into a semi-
permeable membrane that enables innovation to move more easily be-
tween the external environment and the companies’ internal innovation 
process.”64 Cooperation is an essential means of knowledge-sourcing65 
and the partnerships that are created in these collaborations are “as im-
portant as the ownership of the actual knowledge.”66 Of course, utilizing 
external knowledge is not an entirely new phenomenon; however, it 
takes place much more rapidly today and is distinguished by the syste-
matic integration of the strategy into the overall business model.67 
                                                                                                                                               
 57. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 22–23 (detailing statistics from the National 
Science Foundation showing that small firms accounted for almost 25% of total industry 
spending). 
 58. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 41. 
 59. EIU, supra note 57, at 7 (reporting that “India produces 1 million English-
speaking graduates a year and, by 2008, it will have more technology graduates than the 
population of the UK”). 
 60. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 23 & n.2. 
 61. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 44. 
 62. Id. at 45–49. Chesbrough also notes that larger companies used to be skeptical of 
the quality of R&D from smaller firms. However, reports from the larger laboratories 
suggest that the competition for hiring researchers out of top Ph.D. programs comes not 
from other lab giants but from small start-ups and universities. 
 63. Id. at 51. 
 64. OECD, supra note 3, at 18. 
 65. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7. 
 66. OECD, supra note 3, at 25. 
 67. Id. at 24; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7. 
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B. Modes of Open Innovation 
The open innovation business model is essentially a division of inno-
vation labor.68 Value is created by leveraging more ideas, some of which 
originate externally, and value is captured more effectively by using key 
assets both inside and outside the business.69 In other words, companies 
look both “outside-in” and “inside-out” in this dynamic innovation mod-
el.70 Ultimately, this setup makes it possible for ideas to reach the market 
more quickly and efficiently than when one company is responsible for 
the idea from start to finish.71 
Companies employ open innovation strategies in a variety of ways. 
Modes of “outside-in” innovation include: the purchase or licensing of 
technology; joint ventures; joint development; collaboration within and 
across industries; equity in outside projects; and pooled R&D.72 IBM 
employs many of these techniques, forming strategic collaborative part-
nerships, called “collaboratories,” with universities, customers, and other 
firms to combine resources and skills.73 For example, in 2008, an IBM 
laboratory in California teamed up with Yale University to research algo-
rithms aimed at helping analyze medical images and videos for the pur-
pose of cardiac disease analysis.74 IBM also uses online brainstorming 
sessions, called “Innovation Jams” to assess the value of external 
projects.75 In 2006, one Innovation Jam brought together over 150,000 
people from 104 countries and 67 companies.76 Some 46,000 ideas were 
posted by participants and, in the end, IBM pledged $100 million to col-
laboratively pursue ten new businesses generated through the exercise.77 
The portfolio included initiatives such as real time translation services, 
3D internet and a banking system capable of reaching remote locations in 
emerging market countries.78 
                                                                                                                                               
 68. See CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 1–2, 56–57 
 69. Id. at 2. 
 70. OECD, supra note 3, at 18. 
 71. EIU, supra note 57, at 10. 
 72. OECD, supra note 3, at 37; WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 323. 
 73. Research and Development, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ie/emerging_business 
_centre/research.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
 74. Collaborative Research Initiatives, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/ 
university/collaborativeresearch/projects.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
 75. OECD, supra note 3, at 101. 
 76. Press Release, IBM, IBM Invests $100 Million in Collaborative Innovation Ideas 
(Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/20605.wss 
[hereinafter IBM Press Release] 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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The outbound—or, “inside-out”—innovation strategy is a newer de-
velopment that allows for the exploitation of in-house knowledge that 
has yet to be commercialized.79 Modes of “inside-out” innovation also 
include licensing, joint ventures, and venture capital, as well as internal 
corporate venturing, and divesting—or, “spinning out”—unused technol-
ogies.80 IBM licenses a considerable amount of technology and also sells 
internally-developed technology components to its competitors.81 These 
tactics work to make the technology more cost-effective, especially when 
fierce competition bars IBM from controlling or maintaining a competi-
tive edge in any one branch of technology.82 Another radical innovation 
strategy is IBM’s internal corporate venturing through an internal web-
site they call the “Thinkplace.”83 Acting like an internal market, em-
ployees post ideas and proposals and their colleagues vote on them.84 
The highest rated ideas move on to the next stage where a manager spon-
sors and takes ownership of each idea’s development.85 Three to four 
employees from around the world form a team and allocate one day a 
week to work on the project.86 In this way, IBM invests and capitalizes 
on its employees and encourages cross-border collaboration. 
C. Globalized Open Innovation 
Globalization has collapsed the world of R&D, dramatically expanding 
the number of potential partners in the development of global innovation 
networks.87 Firms forge these networks by building their own R&D facil-
ities abroad and by collaborating with local partners and suppliers in for-
eign countries.88 Locations for R&D investment are often based on a 
country’s technological infrastructure as well as the firm’s abilities to 
grasp trends in local markets, to benefit from local knowledge and skilled 
personnel, to access technology and spillover from other R&D activities, 
to support local manufacturing facilities, and to form strategic alliances 
with universities or government institutions.89 In this regard, emerging 
                                                                                                                                               
 79. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 8. 
 80. OECD, supra note 3, at 38, 40. 
 81. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 109. 
 82. See id. at 108. 
 83. OECD, supra note 3, at 97 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 8; see OECD, supra note 
3, at 33. 
 88. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 8. 
 89. OECD, supra note 3, at 30–32; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 
3, at 8. 
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countries are increasingly attractive because of low costs and, where the 
education system is strong, a large number of trained researchers.90 Low-
er costs are attractive for any business, but the allure isn’t only about the 
bottom line; there is also the potential for smaller companies—those that 
would not otherwise have the necessary resources or level of invest-
ment—to enter the globalized market.91 
Despite this potential leveling of the playing field between MNEs and 
small firms, research shows that at least 98% of the 700 firms with the 
largest R&D expenditures are MNEs. These 700 firms account for close 
to half of the world’s total R&D expenditure and more than two thirds of 
the world’s business R&D.92 Recent evidence shows that these top 
spenders are increasing their investments outside their home countries.93 
IBM is one of the top twenty firms in R&D expenditures94 and it has tru-
ly internationalized its R&D strategy. Since 1995, it has operated a whol-
ly owned R&D facility in China95 and currently has collaboratories un-
derway in China, India, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Tai-
wan.96 Furthermore, IBM is working with Taiwan’s publicly funded In-
dustrial Technology Reasearch Institute, its Institute for Information In-
dustry, and several universities to research and develop healthcare ser-
vices and devices geared toward preventive medicine and wellness.97 
                                                                                                                                               
 90. OECD, supra note 3, at 31. This phenomenon is interesting on a social level as 
well. In what is basically a reverse “brain drain,” large companies invest resources and 
train local talent in their capacity as local employees. Thus, the brightest minds continue 
to boost their local economies and foster further growth in their countries. This is in stark 
contrast to the common concern that MNEs hire local talent to work for their companies 
outside of their home country (usually in a developed country) where they earn money 
for the company and, ultimately, the developed nation. Alternatively, concerns have been 
voiced that the emergence of India and China as seats of research and talent will lead to 
further outsourcing by companies and now in a field of relatively high skill jobs. The 
potential for this to erode national R&D infrastructures is unsettling to those on this side 
of the debate. Thus, the open innovation trend has interesting implications for global 
social policy. 
 91. Id. at 33. 
 92. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2005: 
Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D, 119, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2005 (Oct. 29, 2005). 
 93. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], The Interna-
tionalisation of Business R&D: Evidence, Impacts and Implications, at 21 (2008). 
 94. UNCTAD, supra note 92, at 120. 
 95. Id. at 119. 
 96. Hamm, supra note 19, at 41. 
 97. See Dan Nystedt, Taiwan to Host IBM’s First Joint Healthcare IT Research Unit, 
PCWORLD (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/185193/taiwan; Press Re-
lease, IBM, IBM Research Collaborates with Leading Taiwanese Institutions to Deliver 
Wellness-Centric Healthcare via Cloud Computing (Dec. 21, 2009), available at 
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Taiwan is experienced in technology-driven health care services, and this 
project explores the potential role of mobile devices, analytics, and cloud 
computing in preventative medicine and illness management.98 Ultimate-
ly, the goal is to pioneer smarter solutions, test drive them in Taiwan, and 
then work together to export them to the rest of the world.99 
D. Open Innovation and Intellectual Property  
The type and extent of open innovation strategy pursued in foreign 
countries often reflects the country’s national intellectual property re-
gime.100 In fact, intellectual property is at the heart of open innovation as 
technologies or ideas being accessed, licensed, or sold are embodiments 
of intellectual property. “[T]he open innovation paradigm . . . is as much 
a change in the use, management, and employment of [intellectual prop-
erty] as it is in technical and research driven generation of [intellectual 
property].”101 With open innovation strategies, companies take a pro-
active approach to intellectual property, usually in the form of patents, as 
an integral part of their technology strategy and capital creation.102 Pa-
tents are strategically utilized not only to leverage a firm’s own product 
development, but also to profit off others’ uses of its ideas.103 Thus, firms 
shop for patents that compliment their own innovations and also offer 
unused technologies for more efficient allocation. 
A clear example of intellectual property rights at the heart of an open 
innovation strategy is that of pooled R&D. “[F]irms donate [intellectual 
property] to the open-source project while exploiting the common bene-
fits of all contributors to facilitate the sale of related products.”104 For 
instance, IBM has donated 300 of its software patents to the public do-
main for anyone working on open source projects.105 Further, IBM em-
ployees are often tasked with contributing to open source software.106 
These activities may seem counterintuitive for value creation; however, 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29086.wss; Yeshim Deniz, IBM to De-
liver Healthcare Through Cloud Computing, AJAX WORLD MAG. (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://ca.sys-con.com/node/1227658. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
100. OECD, supra note 3, at 42. 
101. WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 320. 
102. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 56, 155. 
103. Id. 
104. WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 323. 
105. OECD, supra note 3, at 104. IBM will retain the patents, but has agreed not to 
seek royalties or place restrictions on their use, as long as they are used in open source 
projects. 
106. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 45. 
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the donated intellectual property creates demand for related products and 
services sold by IBM and fosters industry advancement and goodwill.107 
In open source situations, the intellectual property created is nonpro-
prietary and, therefore, the arrangement of each party’s rights is less 
complex than in situations such as partnerships and collaborations.108 The 
obvious question that all partnerships encounter is how to properly allo-
cate the benefits of the partnership.109 IBM customizes each partnership 
agreement,110 producing a range of results from publicly shared and 
royalty free outputs to sponsored research where the output is intended to 
be owned by one or both of the partners.111 However, one survey reports 
that of 300 senior executives, 60% of them indicated that intellectual 
property theft is the biggest risk in collaborating on innovation with in-
ternational partners.112 
Collaborative partnerships may require significant transfers of existing 
intellectual property and the “know-how” or the specialized practical 
skills necessary to utilize these shared technologies.113 Companies face 
an increased risk of leakage of proprietary knowledge, involuntary spil-
lovers, and potential loss of control.114 Further, intellectual property has 
been described as “sticky” because exposure to the technology and 
know-how pollutes the firm, resulting in an “embedding problem.” 115 
Once an employee learns about the intellectual property, the knowledge 
sticks with the employee and he or she unwittingly uses it in the future.116 
The concern over this dissipation of know-how once prevented foreign 
partnerships.117 Now, studies indicate that companies act strategically in 
choosing where to operate abroad, taking account of national intellectual 
                                                                                                                                               
107.  See WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 325. 
108.  See Sawyer, supra note 2, at 317 (“It can become difficult even to identify what 
the proper componential decomposition of a new innovation is. These realities provide 
many challenges for IP, including how to determine what proportion of ownership rights 
the creator of each individual idea should receive.”). 
109. See OECD, supra note 3, at 42. Successful partnerships will discuss these issues 
prior to starting the collaboration, otherwise serious breakdown often occurs. With to-
day’s IP regime, though, the winner might always be the partner with the best contract 
lawyer and the savviest understanding of the complex web of international patent laws.  
110. IBM, supra note 74 
111. Id. 
112. EIU, supra note 57, at 2, 14. 
113. OECD, supra note 3, at 34; see also Eric von Hippel, Cooperation Between Ri-
vals: Informal Know-How Trading, 16 RES. POL’Y 291, 292 (1987). 
114. OECD, supra note 3, at 41. 
115. GENE SLOWINSKI & MATTHEW W. SAGAL, THE STRONGEST LINK: FORGING A 
PROFITABLE AND ENDURING CORPORATE ALLIANCE 154–55 (2003). 
116. Id. 
117. OECD, supra note 3, at 42. 
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property regimes to determine what types of R&D to carry out.118 For 
example, in emerging countries where intellectual property rights are 
weak,119 a company will focus R&D on technologies that require com-
plementary assets unavailable in the host country.120 Additionally, firms 
employ various tactics to foster the trust and confidence necessary to fa-
cilitate a free flow of knowledge within the partnership. Nondisclosure, 
confidentiality, and exclusivity agreements are often central in this en-
deavor.121 
II. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Legal contracts between partners are a common business practice. 
However, in the context of open innovation these contracts take on a cen-
tral role as a means of facilitating the active use of intellectual property 
assets.122 Businesses have adapted to meet the challenges of globalization 
and increased competition by utilizing patents in ways other than for the 
mere protection of ideas.123 Meanwhile, patent law around the world re-
mains static and rooted in a singular logic. It aims to curb a perceived 
market failure by rewarding inventors with a period of exclusivity in or-
der to incentivize further innovation.124 However, this system is unlikely 
to anticipate or be able to react to problems that arise from the offensive 
use of intellectual property assets.125 
Individual nations maintain their own national patent systems. There is 
no global patent law, per se; instead, international patent law is com-
                                                                                                                                               
118. Id. 
119. Some may argue that these countries deserve access to the technologies used in 
the partnership for development purposes. Others will counter that the companies owning 
the proprietary knowledge are not required to allow “free-riders,” even if we are talking 
about a least developed country. Regardless of the “right answer” to this question, bring-
ing advanced technology into a country for the first time can only have positive repercus-
sions for those exposed to it due to the “leaky” and “sticky” nature of IP. 
120. OECD, supra note 3, at 42. 
121. Id. at 103. 
122. Id. 
123. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 81. 
124. R. VAN WENDEL DE JOODE, J.A. DE BRUIJN & M.J.G. VAN EETEN, PROTECTING THE 
VIRTUAL COMMONS: SELF-ORGANIZING OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE COMMUNITIES 
AND INNOVATIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES 52 (2003); Sawyer, supra note 2, at 
321. Admittedly, this is traditionally thought of as the U.S. perspective with other coun-
tries focusing on labor or natural law theories. However, TRIPs harmonization of national 
laws has arguably established this utilitarian philosophy as the mainstay of international 
patent law. Doris Estelle Long, “Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies 
of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 243 (2002). 
125. Cf. Sawyer, supra note 2, at 318 (“Many features of the current IP regime reward 
behavior that blocks the natural flow of innovation in collaborative webs . . . .”). 
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posed of various agreements that link these territorial laws together. 
These agreements have successfully harmonized domestic laws more and 
more over the years; however, important areas are still in discord and the 
overall rationale behind patent law remains static. In order to understand 
how patent law must change, it is important to know the foundation upon 
which the existing laws are built. 
The formal law of patents as we know it today began in the late fif-
teenth century in Venice as “an instrument designed to attract engineers 
to the Republic.”126 Interestingly, this statute did not grant a monopoly to 
the patentee but instead ensured royalties for compulsory licenses, a 
more public policy oriented rationale.127 The notion of intellectual prop-
erty as private property was popularized in America and eventually en-
shrined in The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (the “Paris Convention”) in 1883.128 Though the Paris Conven-
tion grants individuals from any member state equal protection under the 
laws of any other member state,129 a look at the distinct patent laws of 
individual states suggests that the underlying purpose of patent rights 
remains in dispute.130 
The Paris Convention is the “bedrock of the international patent sys-
tem.”131 It commits its members to three key principles. First, members 
must treat foreign inventors from member states no worse than domestic 
                                                                                                                                               
126. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND POLICY 415 (2d ed. 2008). 
127. Id. 
128. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, re-
vised Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, 828 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. Please 
note that the Paris Convention underwent revision several times since its inception on 
Mar. 20, 1883: Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900; Washington on Nov. 6, 1925; London on Jun. 
2, 1934; Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1985; and Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Id.; see also 
DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 421–24. 
129. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 424. 
130. Note, for example, that U.S. law grants patents to the first-to-invent, with contest 
procedures to ensure the correct individual receives the patent and a tenancy-in-common 
grant for joint inventors. On the other hand, all other foreign systems award patents to the 
first-to-file, valuing the sharing of the invention over the protection of the “true” inven-
tor. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 262 (2006), with Tokkyohō [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 
1959, art. 29(2) (amended 2006). 
131. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 426; see also John R Thomas, Multination-
al Patent Acquisition and Enforcement: Public Policy Challenges and Opportunities for 
Innovative Firms, in PATENTS: ISSUES AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 143, 159 (John V. Mar-
tin ed., 2002) (referring to the Convention as “the foundation patent harmonization trea-
ty”); Robert R. Willis, International Patent Law: Should United States and Foreign Pa-
tent Laws Be Uniform? An Analysis of the Benefits, Problems, and Barriers, 10 N.C.J.L. 
& TECH. 283, 288 (2009) (calling the Paris Convention the “foremost international intel-
lectual property regime”). 
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inventors, and must provide them the same protections and the same 
access to legal remedies (this is the “national treatment” provision).132 
Second, national patent rights are independent of one another,133 thus, 
each country must enforce them individually within the distinct patent 
law regimes.134 Third, a patent seeker who files in a member country 
must be given 12 months to file in another member country without pre-
judice regarding information that enters the public domain.135 Known as 
the “international priority principle,” this provision is significant consi-
dering that many nations still have strict laws that any disclosure of an 
invention prior to the filing of a patent defeats the patentability of the 
invention.136 Thus, the priority provision allows the patent seeker to pre-
serve the first filing date while arranging for filing abroad.137 
Though the Paris Convention was a giant step toward alignment of na-
tional patent systems, the agreement fell short of any real substantive 
harmonization, and it failed to streamline the patent application proce-
dures and provide effective enforcement mechanisms. The latter issue 
was addressed in the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), which 
allows a single “international patent application” to be submitted to the 
national offices of designated member countries.138 This simplifies the 
application process and reduces costs. It is important to note, however, 
that the international application does not result in a single, global patent 
but rather commences national applications in jurisdictions that are 
members of the PCT.139 Ultimately, it is still the decision of the national 
patent authority whether to issue a patent and to protect the rights con-
ferred.140 
                                                                                                                                               
132. Paris Convention, supra note 128, art. 2. 
133. Id. art. 4bis. 
134. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 159. 
135. Paris Convention, supra note 128, art. 4. 
136. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Conven-
tion), art. 54(2), concluded Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254 (as amended in 2000) [Euro-
pean Patent Convention] (“The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made 
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other 
way, before the date of filing of the European patent application.”); Tokkyohō [Patent 
Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, arts. 29(1), 30 (amended 2006) (disqualifying any invention 
that was made publicly known more than six months prior to filing the patent in Japan). 
137. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 160. 
138. Patent Co-operation Treaty, done Jun. 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 
231; see also Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 160–61 (citing ABBOTT, FREDRICK ET AL., 
THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 
646 (1999)). 
139. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 161; Willis, supra note 131, at 291. 
140. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 211 
(2008). 
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The desire for substantive harmonization of patent laws was finally ad-
dressed in TRIPs under the WTO framework.141 This agreement, adopted 
by more than 153 members,142 is the primary authority on international 
patent law, as it directly incorporates the Paris Convention143 and also 
provides minimum substantive standards, enforcement provisions, and a 
dispute settlement mechanism.144 Though this agreement mandates that 
members bring their national laws into harmonized compliance, there is 
still considerable flexibility built into the agreement,145 and a variety of 
issues remain the province of national law. 
The TRIPs substantive standards provide that, at a minimum, members 
must give patent rights for inventions in all fields of technology as long 
as they are new, involve an inventive step, and are useful.146 With a few 
exceptions to patentability,147 this standard clearly indicates the outer 
parameters for which patents will be granted in exchange for disclo-
sure.148 TRIPs enshrines the traditional utilitarian, market failure logic by 
mandating—with a few exceptions149—the right to exclude others from 
“making, using, offering for sale, selling[,] or importing” the patented 
subject for at least 20 years.150 TRIPs also requires members to provide 
minimum enforcement mechanisms domestically151 and provides access 
                                                                                                                                               
141. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (2004) [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
142. See generally World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 
2009) (listing members as of July 23, 2008). 
143. TRIPs, supra note 141, art 2. 
144. Thomas, supra note 131, at 144, 163. 
145. For example, Article 7 specifies that IP rights should be “conducive to social and 
economic welfare.” Article 8 allows for the protection of public health and the promotion 
of public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development.” Article 30 provides for “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights con-
ferred by a patent.” And Article 66 allows grace periods for least-developed countries to 
comply with the standards. TRIPs, supra note 141. 
146. TRIPs, supra note 141, art. 27. 
147. Id. art 27(2), (3) (providing exceptions to patentability for diagnostic, therapeutic, 
and surgical methods for treating humans or animals; for biological processes for grow-
ing plants or breeding animals; and for interests such as avoiding serious prejudice to the 
environment or protecting public order, morality, or human, animal, or plant life). 
148. Id. art. 29 (“[A]n applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in 
the art.”). 
149. Id. art 30. 
150. Id. arts. 28, 33; see Long, supra note 124, at 243. 
151. TRIPs, supra note 141, art 41, 44–46. 
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to the Dispute Settlement Body152 of the WTO, where the flex of other 
trade measures can pressure compliance with intellectual property 
laws.153 
All in all, the Paris Convention, the PCT, and TRIPs together provide 
the first steps towards a harmonized patent system. However, the interna-
tional community continues to debate the future of patent law and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) is a forum in which 
members frequently grapple with such issues. Created in 1967, this spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations has as its mandate to “promote the 
protection of intellectual property throughout the world.”154 In this role, 
the WIPO acts as the administrator of several intellectual property 
agreements including the Paris Convention and the PCT.155 Additionally, 
TRIPs provides for an ongoing relationship with WIPO; for instance, 
WIPO members act as consultants regarding the implementation of 
TRIPs provisions.156 WIPO also develops intellectual property policy and 
serves as a forum for discussion of potential improvements to interna-
tional intellectual property rights. It is in this vein that WIPO’s Standing 
Committee on the Law of Patents has been addressing issues of harmoni-
zation.157 Nevertheless, to acquire, manage, and enforce patent rights 
throughout the world is a complex and costly endeavor.158 Even firms 
with the means to successfully achieve these ends may find the system 
inefficient in or incapable of supporting their global innovation.159 
                                                                                                                                               
152. Id. art 64. 
153. Cf. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 140, at 200 (explaining that a members 
protection of intellectual property rights plays a role in either encouraging or discourag-
ing trade with other members); DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 777 (describing the 
ability of members to retaliate against countries that refuse to comply with the agreement 
through the suspension of other trade concessions or obligations). 
154.What is WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
155. Id. 
156. TRIPs, supra note 141, art 68. 
157. World Intellectual Prop. Org., Substantive Patent Law Harmonization, 
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/harmonization.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
158. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143–144. 
159. C.f. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, PATENT REFORM IN THE 111TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 7 (2009) 
(“[P]atent protection in a single jurisdiction is an inefficient method to protect the interest 
of both domestic and international inventors.”); Sawyer, supra note 2, at 318 (“Current 
policy favors linear, centralized innovation, and blocks the natural rhythm of the colla-
borative web.”). 
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III. PATENT HARMONIZATION THROUGH THE LENS OF OPEN 
INNOVATION 
It has been stated that “[t]he continued need for harmonization remains 
prevalent due to the globalization of commerce, the reduction of trade 
barriers, and the need for stability and predictability in international pa-
tent protection.”160 However, despite the forces driving the international 
buzz over harmonization,161 the conversation largely fails to consider the 
implications of globalized commerce for patent reform. Open innovation, 
as one such trend in global business, should be considered both for the 
insight it can provide on patent reform, as well as for the impact that 
proposed harmonization can have on the stability and predictability of 
patent law in use. Harmonization debates generally focus on broader is-
sues such as patent quality, costs, and scope of patentability with a spe-
cific focus on differences in patent priority, grace periods, and enforce-
ment.162 These issues must be reexamined through the lens of open inno-
vation. 
A. Patent Priority 
The United States is the only patent-issuing nation in the world to 
maintain a first-to-invent priority system.163 In the event that more than 
one application is filed in the U.S. claiming the same invention, the pa-
tent is awarded to the applicant who can establish the earliest “date of 
conception, and reduction to practice of the invention,” as well as rea-
sonable diligence to patent.164 Outside the U.S., the first-to-file priority 
system grants the patent to the first applicant, regardless of whether he 
was actually the original inventor.165 On the most basic level, the co-
existence of these two systems could result in the award of patent rights 
                                                                                                                                               
160. Ryan M. Corbett, Note, Harmonization of US and Foreign Patent Law and H.R. 
2795: The Patent Reform Act of 2005, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 717, 722–23 (2006). 
161. See generally Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, S. 515, S. 610, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (bills in both houses proposing significant changes to initiate some level of har-
monization); EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that “European 
patents are granted on the basis of harmonised law codified in the European Patent Con-
vention” and exploring the potential for future international patent regimes); World Intel-
lectual Prop. Org., supra note 157 (providing background on the international body’s 
work toward harmonization). 
162. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 151–58; see also SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra 
note 159; Willis, supra note 131. 
163. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 152. 
164. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006); see also SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 13. 
165. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 153. 
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to different individuals for the same invention.166 Proponents of the first-
to-invent argue that it is a more equitable system, ensuring that the origi-
nal inventor secures the patent.167 Supporters of the first-to-file system 
believe that it provides greater legal certainty within innovative indus-
tries because the date of priority is stable and easily discernable.168 
Moreover, it reduces the complexity and limits the delays and the costs 
that arise when the true inventor is contested.169 
The priority system has several implications for open innovation. In a 
world where intellectual property assets are used offensively (rather than 
merely guarded jealously) the international community must consider the 
best way to manage licensing. Certainty of patent ownership facilitates 
efficient transfers of licensing and technology.170 However, the first-to-
invent system breeds uncertainty in a manner that is particularly harsh on 
small firms. When attempting to sell or license internally developed in-
tellectual property, small firms may have reduced bargaining power since 
“true” ownership may be contested.171 Alternatively, lengthy and costly 
proceedings are often mandatory to prove priority of inventorship, and 
this leaves smaller (perhaps geographically removed) partners at a dis-
tinct disadvantage. In collaborative partnerships, the evidence necessary 
to win such a contest may be harder to manage or even inaccessible after 
the alliance ends. Further, U.S. law is ambiguous with respect to the level 
of contribution required by a team member to qualify as an inventor, and 
this fosters uncertainty and apprehension during collaboration.172 Hence, 
                                                                                                                                               
166. Id. at 143, 172. Consider the following example that takes place among applicants 
from member nations of the previously mentioned treaties: applicant A files for a patent 
in country Y (a first-to-file country), as well as in country Z (a first-to-invent country). 
One month later, applicant B also files for a patent in both countries Y and Z claiming the 
exact same invention as applicant A. In country Y, applicant A clearly wins the patent as 
well as all subsequent patents filed in first-to-file countries using the priority principle 
under the Paris Convention. However, if applicant B can in fact prove that it is the first 
inventor, applicant B will win patent protection in country Z. Thus, different parties hold 
the rights to the same invention in different nations, and the international community 
lacks legal certainty. 
167. Willis, supra note 131, at 295. 
168. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 14. 
169. Id. 
170. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 184 (stating that patents can facilitate li-
censing or sale of technology but only when boundaries are well defined). 
171. Cf. id. at 167 (“Small inventors especially suffer because fuzzy boundaries mean 
that they realize less value from licensing or selling their patents.”). 
172. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH 15 (2005). Further, it should be noted that the U.S. sys-
tem raises issues of apprehension and uncertainty even once the collaboration is com-
plete. Where both parties to an invention are named as “joint inventors,” they each, indi-
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pre-research contracting is exceedingly important; meanwhile, this also 
carries serious implications for unsophisticated parties.173 
B. Grace Periods 
Grace periods are another hotly contested issue within international 
negotiations. After a public disclosure of an invention (through publica-
tion or sale) by either the inventor or a third-party, the U.S. grants the 
inventor a grace period of one year to file a patent application.174 Foreign 
jurisdictions are not as lenient. In Japan, an inventor has six months after 
personally disclosing the invention and no grace period at all for disclo-
sures by third parties,175 and the EU holds that “any sales or publication 
of an invention anywhere in the world prior to the filing date defeats the 
patentability of an invention.”176 Proponents of the grace period argue 
that it allows leeway for inventors who are unfamiliar with foreign patent 
regimes and that it encourages public testing of inventions.177 Critics ar-
gue that grace periods only serve to elongate the patent term and increase 
commercial uncertainties.178 
Of particular interest in the case of open innovation are the debates 
concerning academic and scientific communities. Though these com-
munities have long been partners in innovation, the academic research 
community relies on norms that contravene many patent law prin-
ciples.179 Based on the notion that the best way to further science is to 
share research results, academic researchers widely believe that new 
knowledge should be shared as quickly as possible.180 Though academics 
are fairly patent-savvy today,181 grace periods help support the continued 
practice of quick publication of academic research results.182 Critics of 
                                                                                                                                               
vidually, have exclusive rights granted under the patent. As with the real property con-
cept of a “tenancy in common,” each can do with the patent what he will, including li-
censing or selling the innovation to his or her partner’s competitors. Clearly, this system 
raises some concerns for open innovation. 
173. Id. 
174. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
175. Tokkyohō [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, arts. 29(1), 30 (amended 2006). 
176. Thomas, supra note 132, at 153; see also European Patent Convention, supra note 
136, art. 54(2). 
177. JOSEPH STRAUS, EXPERT OPINION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN 
EUROPEAN LAW 50 (2000). 
178. JAN E.M. GALAMA, EXPERT OPINION ON THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE 
INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN EUROPEAN LAW 13 (2000). 
179. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary rights and the Norms of Science in Biotech-
nology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 (1987). 
180. Id. 
181. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 9. 
182. STRAUS, supra note 177, at 54. 
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grace periods contend that academics and scientists choosing to partici-
pate in the commercial sphere must accept the legal rules that govern that 
sphere and adjust their behavior accordingly.183 However, businesses are 
increasingly reaching out to fund university R&D,184 though it has been 
argued that “[u]niversities are less well equipped to employ a ‘pro-
active’ [intellectual property rights] strategy.”185  
Ultimately, the patent regime should help ensure that collaborative 
partnerships are mutually beneficial. Where one partner adheres to the 
norms of a specific community, the grant of patent rights should not be 
predicated upon the relinquishment of community norms.186 Thus, as 
long as the norms of these communities do mandate prompt publication 
of findings, grace periods would facilitate open collaboration.187 
C. Enforcement 
TRIPs provides for the first international dispute resolution mechanism 
for issues regarding intellectual property violations. However, disputes at 
the WTO are brought by and against nations, and, while they regard in-
dividual instances of violation, the WTO adjudicators are not able to 
coerce nations into providing remedies,188 and they do not have any true 
law-making authority.189 Therefore, patent litigation largely takes place 
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in the national court systems, subject to national patent laws. Further, 
patent holders bear the responsibility for monitoring their own patents in 
each individual country.190 Both of these activities are costly and have 
implications for actual patent value. It has been stated, as an industry rule 
of thumb, that $1.5 million in legal fees can be expected in the course of 
defending any given patent infringement lawsuit.191 Hence, some have 
found that litigation costs are in fact a disincentive to innovate.192 One 
study found that “worldwide patent profits were about 6 percent of R&D 
while litigation costs were also about 13 percent . . . that is, patents acted 
as a net tax on R&D.”193 
Thus, for any party using open innovation, the threat of litigation and 
the cost of monitoring worldwide patents may be prohibitive. Further, 
with open innovation, the need for protection extends beyond the is-
suance of the patent itself and must also contemplate an increase in con-
tractual exchanges of intellectual property rights. Small firms may be at a 
particular disadvantage in terms of protecting their rights since they are 
not as well positioned to spread the cost of litigation over large numbers 
of patents.194 This has implications for the relative bargaining power of 
different sized partners in a collaborative partnership. While a firm like 
IBM may have a handle on monitoring and protecting its intellectual 
property, a small firm from a remote location might not stand a chance. 
Additionally, though the Paris Convention assures equal access to protec-
tion and remedies for all members, the practicalities of that access are 
likely to prove prohibitive. 
D. Patent Quality 
Patent Quality is a concern that arises concurrently with many of the 
above-mentioned issues. For example, some commentators argue that 
shifting to a first-to-file system encourages a rush to the patent office at 
the expense of patent quality.195 Grace periods allow for the receipt of 
feedback on inventions, which would facilitate perfection of patents prior 
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to filing and would thus enhance patent quality.196 This could, in turn, 
reduce litigation because  poor patent quality often leads to  inadvertent 
infringement..197 Poor patent quality cannot be tied to any one source, 
though the flood of patent applications in recent years does not bode well 
for quality control. Patent boundaries are often fuzzy and their scope can 
be hard to determine, which give rise to inadvertent infringement.198 Fur-
ther, unclear rights raise bargaining costs and heighten the chance that 
deals will break down.199 Thus, it becomes “increasingly costly to find 
and negotiate the necessary patent license in advance of . . . technology 
development and adoption decisions.”200 To better support the increased 
movement of technology in light of open innovation, patent reform must 
focus on enhancing patent quality. 
E. Open Innovation Raises Additional Concerns with International Pa-
tent Law 
In addition to these common areas of focus for patent harmonization, 
open innovation raises unique questions about the appropriateness of the 
international patent regime. Some scholars argue that advances like open 
innovation do not readily fit under the sales-oriented, proprietary model 
of intellectual property, which underlies agreements such as TRIPs.201 
TRIPs applies a one-size-fits-all standard of strong protection for all 
technologies, reflecting its primary goal as an instrument of trade.202 It is 
questionable whether an instrument of trade is even an appropriate means 
to regulate innovation since “innovative practices are simply not well-
described as means by which goods invented and produced in one place 
are sold in another.”203 Further, as previously discussed, the WTO seems 
ill-equipped as an adjudicatory body for disputes arising among patent 
holders. 
The particular grounds covered—or neglected—by TRIPs are also 
problematic in the context of open innovation. One basic concern is that 
an across-the-board mandate of a minimum of 20 years of exclusory pro-
tection could be excessive. With product life cycles drastically short-
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ened—for example, most software is only used for two to three 
years204—patents could bar further innovation on a given technology 
even if that technology is no longer actively used. This raises another 
concern regarding the cumulative nature of inventions.205 The highly 
complex nature of products today is often the result of a cumulative 
process206 whereby knowledge from one innovation becomes input for 
subsequent research.207 This interdependence of knowledge creation rais-
es questions of infringement protection. Notably, TRIPs does not set an 
upper bound for intellectual property protection which creates a potential 
holdout problem.208 Original patent holders are able to block future de-
velopment and capture a disproportionate amount of the value of new 
innovations. Future inventors are also left with an often impossible task 
of obtaining licenses from disperse and numerous ex ante patent own-
ers.209 Open innovation only further exacerbates this problem, though 
some companies have tried to remedy the situation by creating patent 
pools of the intellectual property required for any given product. Never-
theless, patent reform must contemplate better systems to support cumu-
lative knowledge production. 
One of the most important assumptions undergirding the international 
patent regime is that patents are a positive incentive to innovate and that 
the inventor would have no means to recoup his investment without a 
patent.210 However, some research indicates that an open innovation re-
gime may in fact be superior as it results in lower innovation costs, as 
well as lower imitation costs.211 This finding is premised on the assump-
tion that innovators are able to gain advantages simply by being the first 
to discover such knowledge.212 R&D managers have themselves indi-
cated that other means of appropriating value—for instance, lead-time 
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advantages, complementary products, or trade secrecy—are more effec-
tive than patents in earning returns on investment.213 These mechanisms 
lend themselves well to open innovation strategies, which suggests that 
open innovation may be steering companies away from proprietary pa-
tent models. Further, in the absence of patent rights, there has not been a 
corresponding dip in innovation,214 while stringent enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights has actually blocked innovation.215 Along with the 
factors listed above, market forces may step in to ensure an optimal level 
of invention.216 Notably, thriving open-source communities provide a 
prime example of continued innovation in the absence of intellectual 
property rights. 
IV. CHANGING THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT PATENT RIGHTS 
The debate around patent harmonization should be framed with inno-
vation in mind. However, for the benefit of the ever-evolving global 
business landscape, the discussion on patent reform must shift to reex-
amine the underlying rationale of patent law. Open innovation is the next 
chapter of global R&D, and, in this technological world, businesses must 
adapt or retreat. When businesses work together to license their unused 
intellectual property and to seek needed intellectual property from others, 
the world of technology and innovation multiplies exponentially.217 Still, 
the interconnectedness of these businesses creates dependence; thus, 
these businesses need trust and clarity in order to thrive. Patent law con-
tinues to be based on static notions of incentives to innovate, inventor 
rewards, and public disclosure.218 The time has come to reevaluate this 
one-size-fits-all system 219 and redefine the goals of patent law. To better 
support today’s global businesses, the patent system should aim to clarify 
boundaries, simplify processes, and facilitate an ever growing intellectual 
property marketplace. 
Patents are not always easily defined, and the lack of notice within the 
system makes infringement almost inevitable.220 As with real property, 
the notice system should serve as a warning to potential trespassers and 
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should aid in the movement of resources to the most efficient users. This 
would make technology markets more efficient221 and reduce the transac-
tion costs of open innovation. As explained by Ronald Coase, “transac-
tion costs” include the costs of: searching, information provision, bar-
gaining, decision-making, and contracting.222 Through a better interna-
tional notice system, search costs would be reduced as parties could easi-
ly access the patents they need or find buyers for those patents they are 
looking to sell. Making information accessible to all parties would equa-
lize bargaining power and reduce litigation costs from inadvertent in-
fringement. Open innovation also raises the need for more robust licens-
ing mechanisms and patent registries to help facilitate connections and 
the efficient allocation of resources. 
This signals the emergence of an intellectual property marketplace. 
Many prematurely assumed that the marketplace was already here and 
patent brokers and online innovation marketplaces emerged to cater to 
the new clientele.223 However, key problems bar the emergence of a 
functional intellectual property market.224 A general lack of information 
and a lack of standards for valuation make the coordination of market 
exchange difficult.225 Additionally, in a world of virtual interconnected-
ness, assets are now created and held in virtual spaces, and this gives rise 
to questions of origin and jurisdiction. An effective patent system will 
become not only a defense mechanism, but will also be expected to de-
fine and regulate an emergent innovation market. 
One proposed solution is to set up an administrative type of approach 
that would allow for continuous adjustments to a global innovation poli-
cy.226 This system would rely on WIPO as a locus of innovation policy 
tasked with the interpretation of TRIPs’ flexibilities and exceptions in 
accordance with the needs of the innovation community.227 Ultimately, 
amendments to TRIPs could be made to extend exceptions for innova-
tion, and WIPO’s administrative role would expand to vet these excep-
tions.228 This is an interesting suggestion and a potentially viable solu-
tion. However, while innovation is the focus, this focus is still situated 
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within the proprietary, trade-based paradigm of TRIPs. And, while en-
hancing the flexibilities of this international instrument on an ad hoc ba-
sis may provide innovators some protection, it is unlikely to encourage 
and support the continued development of innovation strategies. 
It is important to consider a way forward that will avoid further entren-
chment of outdated intellectual property rationales that are likely to stifle 
the evolution of innovation.229 Any successful solution will have to be 
flexible. Even the WIPO delegates have pointed out that “[i]n view of the 
rapid technological innovation and the social and economic challenges, 
the function, value[,] and impact of the patent system need to be con-
stantly adjusted . . . .”230 Further, it has been suggested that the effective-
ness of patents depends largely on the implementing institution.231 Not 
only must a new institution other than the WTO be named as the arbiter 
of patents, but the definition of “effective” must be reexamined as well. 
As noted, owners of intellectual property are taking increasingly proac-
tive roles in the management of their assets under open innovation. The 
ethos of patent law must shift accordingly to “[redefine] ‘ownership’ to 
focus on the right to distribute, rather than the right to exclude.”232 Patent 
law is ripe for a paradigm shift akin to that of innovation with a focus on 
a more comprehensive notion of the law’s end goals. 
CONCLUSION 
The lone inventor no longer dominates the field of innovation. In fact, 
the companies who command these activities are beginning to embody 
the fundamental principle that two heads are better than one.233 Yet, the 
patent system, built to encourage innovation and reward inventors, re-
mains faithful to the lone inventor. Thus, patents have become, at times, 
obstacles to successful innovation rather than incentives.234 Firms re-
spond to the failure of the patent system by finding alternative means of 
protection and value creation.235 However, because intellectual property 
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assets remain at the center of open innovation strategies, complete aban-
donment of the patent regime is not a viable solution. 
Open innovation signals a shift in focus from isolated product devel-
opment to faster, increasingly proactive management of intellectual 
property assets.236 Firms look “outside-in” for knowledge and technology 
to compliment their internal efforts, and they look “inside-out” to capital-
ize on others’ uses of their unused intellectual property.237 Though busi-
nesses have long employed these tactics, the rate at which they occur 
today—and the overall integration of the strategy into business models—
signals a new era of R&D.238 Firms can no longer deny the importance of 
knowledge produced outside their four walls, and those that have learned 
to efficiently locate and integrate this knowledge have found a competi-
tive edge. Today, complex technologies composed of multiple patents 
and ideas are created faster, produced faster, and, ultimately, replaced 
faster. The key to this cycle is the proactive, offensive use and manage-
ment of intellectual property rights.239 
Patent laws remain rooted in a traditional notion of reactive, defensive 
exclusion of others.240 In fact, the regime offers no affirmative rights to 
inventors—it merely offers the right to prevent others from exploiting 
one’s invention.241 This and other substantive minimum mandates in the 
TRIPs agreement were heralded in the international arena as a great step 
forward. However, the harmonization debate has neglected changing 
global trends for too long. To continue to root patent law in a proprietary, 
sales-oriented model of intellectual property242 is to ignore the full poten-
tial of innovation and intellectual property. 
At the least, the debate over patent harmonization should be refocused 
through a new lens. The push to coordinate national regimes must keep 
in mind the ways in which these rights are utilized, the different players 
who use the system, and the clarity needed to meet users’ varying goals. 
However, if patent harmonization continues to rely on the nineteenth 
century rationale, open innovation may lead companies away from the 
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use of patents. Patent reform should thus reevaluate the underlying goals 
of patent law and recognize that innovation does not always have to re-
sult in product creation to generate economic value. With this under-
standing, patent law can move in a new direction with an aim to further 
knowledge production, ease the sharing of ideas, and promote and police 
the growing international intellectual property market. 
The lone inventor is not extinct. She continues to discover radical new 
ideas and technologies that change our lives. However, today, this inven-
tor is not alone; she exists in a network of interconnected knowledge 
producers. The inventor thrives, despite the stunted growth of the patent 
law meant to support her. Patent reform must take up the torch and adapt 
to the globalizing world. 
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